











market	 valuation	 of	wealth	 assets.	 The	whole	 creates	 a	 form	of	 empiricism	by	
metrics	or	calibration.	The	aggregation	also	lends	itself	to	data	as	history	rather	





















the	preceding	decades.	Meanwhile,	 central	bank	policy	 responses	have	 created	
new	opportunities	for	the	global	rich	to	become	even	richer.i	To	a	large	degree	the	
idea	 that	 the	rest	of	us	are	dragged	along	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	wealthy	has	been	
exposed	 as	 a	 myth.	 Returns	 captured	 (rather	 than	 created)	 by	 the	 rich	 have	
affected	the	many,	and	not	just	in	a	financial	sense.	The	associated	fiscal	and	policy	
effects	 on	 welfare,	 health	 systems,	 pensions,	 collective	 union	 activity	 and	 our	
simple	sense	of	community	cohesion	and	quality	of	life,	rather	than	quantity	and	
materiality,	 have	all	 been	harmed.	And	 this	 is	 just	 in	 the	Global	North.	 For	 the	
Global	South	second	best	 “development”	 forms	have	 fuelled	 the	North	 in	many	
ways,	 creating	 the	 underlying	 deflationary	 effects	 that	 have	 kept	 the	 North	
consuming	as	well	as	contributing	to	the	current	account	imbalances	that	lead	to	
capital	flows	for	asset	bubbles.	In	return	the	Global	South	has	experienced	its	own	








versus	 a	 deep	 sense	 of	 injustice.	 A	 great	 deal	 has	 now	been	written	 regarding	
Piketty’s	work	(see	Fullbrook	&	Morgan	eds.	2014).	It	is	widely	acknowledged	to	
be	 the	 well‐intentioned	 product	 of	 an	 engaged	 and	 highly	 reasonable	 social	
democrat;	 one	 unfairly	 demonised	 at	 various	 times	 as	 a	 data	 manipulating	
unreconstructed	Marxist	 –	 in	 places	where	 such	 an	 appellation	 is	 a	 pejorative	
term.ii		
	
The	 key	 questions	 arising	 from	 Capital	 are:	 Can	 it	 galvanise	 opinion	 in	 an	





“reassuringly	 conventional	 in	 its	 analysis	 and	 prescriptions,	 and	 so	 less	
threatening	 to	 familiar	ways	of	 thought,”	 (Wade,	2014:	p.	 11).	 It	 is	 radical,	 but	
principally	 in	 the	 conservative	 context	 of	mainstream	 economics.	 Beyond	 that	
context	 one	 might	 describe	 it	 as	 a	 palatable	 form	 of	 radicalism	 whose	







Piketty’s	 core	claim	 is	 that	 there	 is	a	basic	 tendency	 in	capitalism	 for	 stocks	of	
wealth	 (assets)	 and	 flows	 of	 income	 (both	 from	 assets	 and	 work)	 to	 become	
concentrated.	Capitalism	has	no	inherent	mechanisms	that	serve	to	prevent	this.	








actual	 wealth	 and	 income.	 Such	 events	 also	 create	 pressures	 for	 institutional	
arrangements,	and	these	provide	a	second	way	in	which	restrictions	can	be	placed	









Piketty	 notes	 that	 “Intellectual	 and	 political	 debate	 about	 the	 distribution	 of	
wealth	has	long	been	based	on	an	abundance	of	prejudice	and	a	paucity	of	fact	[…	













that	he	will	 “use	 the	words	capital	and	wealth	 interchangeably,	as	 if	 they	were	
perfectly	synonymous,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	47),	and	then	defines	capital	as,	“the	sum	
total	 of	 nonhuman	 assets	 that	 can	 be	 owned	 and	 exchanged	 on	 some	market.	




























that	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 “generalisable”	 and	 then	 on	 what	 gradually	 becomes	
available	(much	of	it	stored	in	the	World	Top	Incomes	Database).	His	oldest	and	
most	 continuous	 sources	 are	 Britain	 and	 France	 beginning	 from	 around	 1700,	
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followed	by	Germany,	the	United	States	and	Sweden	from	around	1800,	the	rest	
of	 Europe	 and	 Japan	 from	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 and	 extending	 to	 other	
nations	of	the	world	through	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century.iv		
	
Based	 on	 the	 available	 data	 Piketty	 identifies	 a	 significant	U	 shape	 in	 national	
capital	 for	 individual	 states	 and	 for	 Europe	 and	America	 collectively.	 The	 total	
value	 of	 accumulated	 capital	 assets	 falls	 in	 the	 early	 to	 mid	 decades	 of	 the	
twentieth	 century	 and	 then	 begins	 to	 recover	 from	World	War	 II	 (see	 Piketty,	













The	growth	of	 capital’s	 share	accelerated	with	 the	victories	of	Margaret	




























the	 United	 States	 contributed	 to	 the	 nation’s	 financial	 instability.	 The	















and	 society	 that	 can	 continue	 functioning	 indefinitely	 with	 such	 extreme	
divergence	 between	 social	 groups,”	 (Piketty,	 2014:	 p.	 297).	Moreover,	 this	 has	
continued	since	the	financial	crisis.	For	example,	 the	top	1%	were	recipients	of	
more	than	90%	of	the	increase	in	national	income	2009‐2012	in	the	United	States.	
So,	 the	 recent	 global	 economic	 crisis	 has	 not	 (unlike	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century)	
served	 to	reset	 income	and	wealth	potentials	along	more	egalitarian	 lines.	One	
might	note	here	Eichengreen’s	 contrast	 between	 the	Great	Depression	 and	 the	
Great	 Recession	 (2015).	 He	 suggests	 that	 the	 character	 of	 the	 initial	 crisis	




Piketty’s	analysis	of	his	data	 is	 far	more	detailed	 than	can	be	set	out	here.vi	He	




is	 that	 the	 data	 seems	 to	 express	 a	 return	 to	 the	 trends	 prior	 to	 his	 period	 of	
exception	in	the	early‐to‐mid	twentieth	century.	However,	his	analysis	also	makes	
clear	 that	 a	 return	 is	 not	 a	 rerun.	 There	 are	 significant	 differences.	 Wealth	
concentrations	were	different	in	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries	because	
societies	 contained	 different	 mixes	 of	 potential	 assets	 based	 on	 the	 way	
economies	 were	 structured.	 Agricultural	 land	 dominated	 and	 then	 later	
commercial	and	industrial	enterprises	emerged	and	the	joint	stock	company	was	
eventually	created.	The	period	prior	to	the	twentieth	was	also	one	of	insignificant	





control	 their	 own	 compensation	 culture	 (Piketty,	 2014:	 pp.	 264‐5,	 277‐8).	










the	 same	 for	 both	 the	 modern	 idle	 rich	 and	 the	 working	 rich,	 though	 not	
necessarily	 always	 for	 the	 same	 reasons.	 Great	 wealth	 creates	 access	 to	more	
lucrative	 investment	 opportunities	 (insider	 information,	 better	 investment	
management	based	on	the	rules	of	systems	and	how	they	can	be	exploited	etc),	
and	so	annual	income	can	be	greater	for	the	idle	rich.	Since,	the	working	rich	also	
















initial	 reference	 to	 his	 3	 laws,	 and	 states	 the	 first.ix	One	 should	 note	 here	 that	




passion	 for	 mathematics	 and	 for	 purely	 theoretical	 and	 often	 highly	
ideological	 speculation,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 historical	 research	 and	
collaboration	with	the	other	social	sciences.	Economists	are	all	too	often	
preoccupied	 with	 petty	 mathematical	 problems	 of	 interest	 only	 to	
themselves.	This	obsession	with	mathematics	is	an	easy	way	of	acquiring	
















once	 rendered	 in	 symbolic	 form	 it	 can	 appear	 as	 though	 something	 has	 been	
explained	 even	 though	 “because”	 may	 be	 omitted	 or	 severely	 attenuated,	
particularly	 where	 a	 quantity	 relation	 is	 simply	 stated.	 It	 need	 not	 be	 an	






a	 social	 science	 context	 can	 conceal	 the	 limits	 of	 any	 given	 mathematical	
expression,	and	obfuscate	regarding	the	lack	of	adequate	further	explanation.		
	





































capital’s	 share	 (in	 the	 first	 law).	However,	 if	 the	 economy	 is	 growing	 then	 the	
savings,	 which	 create	 more	 capital,	 are	 progressively	 part	 of	 an	 ever	 larger	




capital	 (measured	 proportionately	 rather	 than	 in	 simple	 absolute	 levels)	 as	









as	 a	 %,	 and	 g	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 of	 national	 income.	 Piketty	 notes	 that	 the	
significance	of	the	effects	of	s/g	ought	to	be	assessed	in	the	long	term,	smoothing	
out	 any	 volatility	 over	many	 years	 to	 identify	 the	 basic	 trend	 effect	 on	 β.	 The	







capital’s	 share	 of	 national	 income	will	 increase.	 The	 second	 implies	 that	 since	
savings	create	capital,	then	the	higher	the	savings	rate	as	a	%	of	national	income,	
the	faster	capital	will	accumulate,	but	that	this	is	offset	by	faster	economic	growth,	
which	 slows	 down	 the	 relative	 growth	 of	 accumulated	 capital	 compared	 to	
national	income.	Lower	growth,	therefore,	implies	a	more	rapid	potential	for	the	
relative	 accumulation	 of	 capital	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence	 an	 increase	 in	 capital’s	
share	of	national	income	in	the	first	law.								
	
The	 simple	mechanics	 of	 how	different	 components	 of	 Piketty’s	 first	 two	 laws	























where	 r	 is	 the	 rate	of	 return	earned	by	 capital	 and	g	 is	 the	growth	of	national	
income.xi 	For	 Piketty,	 this	mathematical	 inequality	 is	 a	 “fundamental	 force	 for	
divergence”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	424).	For	it	to	be	so	then	one	needs	to	either	assume	




Note:	 these	 patterns	 of	 accentuated	 tendency	 to	 concentration	 of	 capital	 are	
discernible	in	many	countries	over	the	period	of	neoliberal	economic	globalization,	
and	contribute	to	a	global	tendency	towards	increasing	oligarchization	of	wealth.	





Piketty	makes	 the	 point	 that	 the	 long‐term	 rate	 of	 global	 growth,	 rather	 than	
individual	national	growth,	has	always	been	relatively	low	in	%	terms.	Moreover,	
whilst	 there	 has	 been	 a	 step‐change	 increase	 in	 growth	 after	 the	 industrial	
revolution,	and	this	has	extended	because	of	the	spread	of	industrialisation	and	
trade	 through	 the	 catch‐up	 of	 developing	 nations,	 one	 cannot	 augment	 global	
growth	forever	through	dissemination	effects.	If	one	looks	also	to	the	underlying	
technological	 basis	 of	 change	 then	 growth	 in	 total	 may	 be	 higher	 after	 the	
industrial	revolution	but	it	is	much	lower	than	one	might	expect	in	toto	(achieving	
its	highest	rate	of	2.5%	in	the	period	1950‐1980,	but	tending	to	be	around	1%	less	
than	 this). xii 	Piketty	 then	 uses	 this	 as	 context	 for	 r	 >	 g.	 Growth	 seems	 to	 be	
constrained	and	one	can	project	this	forward.	There	is,	however,	no	similar	limit	










continue	 to	 accumulate	 and	 concentrate	 (perhaps	 even	 “indefinitely”,	 Piketty,	
	 10
2014:	p.	519).	This	 claim	 is	made	despite	 the	statement	by	Pikety	 that	 current	
levels	of	inequality	in	the	United	States	mean	“It	is	hard	to	imagine	an	economy	
and	 society	 that	 can	 continue	 functioning	 indefinitely	 with	 such	 extreme	
divergence	between	social	groups,”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	297).		Clearly,	the	long‐term	
political	 consequences	 of	 extreme	 inequality	 demands	 more	 exploration,	
including	 the	 probability	 that	 increasingly	 authoritarian	 capitalist	 states	 will	
emerge	to	preside	over	such	highly	unequal	societies	in	future.	
	
In	any	case,	 the	quote	 	 is	 indicative	 that	Piketty	 is	not	 committing	himself	 in	a	
simple	sense	to	an	underlying	determinism.	He	is	rather	creating	context	for	an	
institutional	solution	to	a	problem	that	cannot	simply	be	assumed	will	solve	itself,	
i.	 e.	 the	 need	 for	 a	 deconcentration	 of	 capital.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 addressing	























article	 I	 of	 the	 1789	 Declaration	 of	 the	 Rights	 of	 Man	 and	 the	 Citizen	




For	 Piketty,	 whatever	 its	 faults	 or	 “imperfections”	 Capital	 is	 a	 work	 in	 the	
construction	of	facts,	a	historical	analysis	seeking	out	data	to	answer	an	important	
socio‐economic	 question.	 The	 pursuit	 of	 that	 data	 necessarily	 required	












audience	 would	 likely	 be	 other	 economists,	 and	 principally	 mainstream	
economists.	 In	 this	 context	 the	 book	 is	 radical.	 It	 places	 an	 empirical	 question	
mark	against	standard	assumptions	of	wealth	distribution	effects,	it	uses	methods	
typically	eschewed	by	mainstream	economists,	it	takes	an	interest	in	institutions,	





and	 in	 2012	 this	 amounted	 to	 a	 $1.8	 trillion	 transfer	 from	 labour	 to	 capital,	
reducing	 the	 US	 labour	 share	 to	 its	 1920s	 level	 (Giovannoni,	 2014).	 As	Wade	
(2014)	notes	this	shift	in	who	gets	what	is	not	occurring	in	a	failed	state	in	some	
global	backwater	where	a	corrupt	government	and	a	predatory	set	of	corporations	
pillage	 the	 population	 in	 some	 exceptional	 fashion.	 It	 has	 become	 the	 normal	
context	 of	 “advanced”	 capitalism,	 an	 advanced	 capitalism	where	we	have	been	
encouraged	over	recent	decades	to	celebrate	this	context	as	the	consequence	of	a	
dynamic	 process	 of	 rewards	 to	 wealth	 creators.	 Those	 who	 question	 this	 are	









whilst	 the	economist	 focuses	on	what	 is	economically	rational	 in	ways	that	are	
often	highly	unrealistic,	and	which	ignore	that	the	rational	has	a	rationale	and	is	
itself	 an	 ethical	 stance	 (a	 form	 of	 unstated	 utilitarianism,	 which	 is	 also	 often	





justified.	 Piketty’s	 great	 contribution	 is	 his	 empirical	 findings.	 The	 gains	 from	
growth	over	the	last	thirty	years	have	been	mainly	captured	by	the	top	decile	and	
within	that	by	the	1%	and	0.1%.	This	raises	the	important	question:	on	what	basis	
has	 the	 income	 from	 growth	 been	 captured?	 It	 has	 not	 been	 by	 work	 in	 any	
reasonable	 sense.	 It	 has	 been	based	 on	 inheritance	 and	ownership	 of	 financial	
assets	 that	 create	 a	 return,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 based	 on	 power	 –	 the	 power	 to	
command	 one’s	 own	 income	 from	 “work”	 and	 by	 control	 over	 huge	 assets	
(corporations).	So,	Piketty’s	analysis	allows	one	to	argue	that	the	returns	to	the	














1950‐1980.	 To	 reiterate,	 Piketty’s	major	 contribution	 is	 the	 data	 that	 provides	
ammunition	to	challenge	the	implicit	ethical	stance	of	advanced	capitalism	–	the	
conflations	and	obfuscations	of	the	cult	of	the	entrepreneur	and	of	the	confusion	





of	 those	 assets	 and	 the	 system	 of	 assets	 are	 part	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 modern	
capitalism’s	instability	that	harms	us	all.	It	provides	a	useful	empirical	basis	for	a	
more	 radical	 critique	 of	 parasitic	 accumulation	 of	 wealth	 and	 oligarchization,	
understood	 as	 social	 evils	 rather	 than	 virtues.	 Thus,	 the	 very	 rich	 become	 a	












book	Why	We	Can’t	Afford	 the	Rich,	 and	does	 so	partly	based	on	Piketty’s	data	
(2014;	see	also	Dorling,	2014).	Though	he	is	aware	that	an	economy	is	also	a	social	
construct	 (Piketty,	 2014:	 p.	 55),	 he	 cannot	 quite	 shake	 the	 mainstream	
economist’s	sense	that	facts	are	neutral.	Recall	that	he	states	his	purpose	is	“not	
to	plead	the	case	of	workers	against	owners	but	rather	to	gain	as	clear	as	possible	
a	 view	of	 reality”	 (Piketty,	 2014:	p.	 40).	Consider	 also:	 “Rather	 than	 indulge	 in	
constructing	a	moral	hierarchy	of	wealth,	which	in	practice	often	amounts	to	an	
exercise	in	Western	ethnocentrism,	I	think	it	is	more	useful	to	try	to	understand	
the	 general	 laws	 that	 govern	 the	 dynamics	 of	wealth,”	 (Piketty,	 2014:	 p.	 445).	









wealth,	 democracy,	 community	 etc.).	 It	 is	 rather	 different	 than	Wilkinson	 and	
Pickett’s	 The	 Spirit	 Level	 (2010),	 despite	 that	 the	 two	 are	 sometimes	 casually	
combined	in	popular	thinking.	However,	in	broader	context,	the	context	in	which	

















financial	 value	 determined	 in	 markets.	 However,	 capital	 as	 a	 concept,	 in	 any	















maintaining	 the	 distinctions	 and	 distinguishing	 between	 capital	 and	 all	 other	
forms	of	wealth	 assets	 is	 also	 important	 because	 this	 allows	 one	 to	 grasp	 that	












is	 also	 the	 existence,	 within	 quite	 specific	 regulatory	 and	 rule	 systems,	 of	 a	
potential	 for	 securitisation,	 resulting	 then	 in	 opportunities	 for	 given	 financial	
organizations	(hedge	funds	etc)	and	thereby	for	the	development	of	speculative	
































carry	 trades),	 some	 experience	 singular	 bubble	 effects	 based	 on	 historical	
conjunctures	(housing),	and	these	can	be	common	to	some	economies	but	rarely	
universal	to	all	(see	Baker,	2014).	As	such,	to	aggregate	all	forms	of	return	into	a	
single	 figure	 is	 highly	 problematic.	 It	 obfuscates	 regarding	 the	 variations	 in	
specific	 return	profiles	and	 thus	 in	 terms	of	 the	actual	 sources	of	 the	return.	A	
focus	on	a	relatively	constant	and	long	term	return	rate	gives	the	impression	that	
















capital	 goods,	 and	 this	 is	 different	 to	 the	original	 definition	of	 capital	 given	by	
Piketty	(nor	is	the	model	about	capital	as	a	social	relation,	despite	being	focused	
on	 physical	 product).	 It	 does,	 however,	 lead	 to	 the	 implication	 that	 there	 is	 a	
constant	rate	of	return	and	to	the	inference	that	it	can	be	higher	than	growth.	But	
this	is	at	the	expense	of	realism.	The	production	function	is	a	standard	and	highly	
















if	 the	 data	 to	which	 it	 is	 referred	 is	 good	 data,	 and	 so	 the	model	 undermines	
Piketty’s	 claim	 to	 be	 concerned	 with	 facts.	 Moreover,	 the	 model	 is	 simply	
incompatible	with	the	further	claim	Piketty	quite	plausibly	makes	that	institutions	
matter	for	who	gets	what	in	a	capitalist	system	(particularly	the	most	wealthy).	
Juxtaposing	 a	 neoclassical	 production	 function	 with	 acknowledgements	 that	
institutions	‐	rules,	regulations,	 laws,	habits,	and	cultures	 ‐	 impact	on	shares	of	
national	income	does	not	establish	that	the	two	can	be	integrated.	This	leads	to	a	




















on	 the	 growth	 of	 this	 inequality	 are	 an	 exception,	 in	 so	 far	 as	 they	 are	 non‐
necessary.	However,	consider	what	this	actually	means	in	terms	of	the	coherence	
of	a	theoretical	stance.	To	argue	that	in	the	absence	of	war,	or	in	the	absence	of	









First,	 it	 conflates	 prior	 with	 more	 basic.	 A	 period	 of	 inequality	 of	 wealth	 and	
income	may	have	occurred	historically	prior	to	one	that	is	more	egalitarian	but	
that	 does	 not	 make	 the	 institutional	 conditions	 that	 enable	 inequality	 more	
fundamental.	 Second,	 it	 tends	 to	 conflate	 duration	with	 primacy,	 the	 historical	
duration	of	periods	of	inequality	may	be	longer	but	again	this	does	not	make	the	
institutional	conditions	that	enable	inequality	more	fundamental.	Note	here	that	
the	 duration	 is	 based	 initially	 on	 few	 cases.	 It	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 institutional	
conditions	that	enabled	inequality	in	those	few	isolated	longer	historical	cases	for	
which	 data	 could	 exist	 that	 lends	 credence	 to	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 long	 term	




why	 they	 are	 ‘normal’.	 This	 requires	 one	 to	provide	historical	 detail	 regarding	
institutions,	but	also	meta‐historical	and	presumably	explanatory	mechanisms	by	
which	 capitalism	 reverts	 to	 “deep	 structures”.	 This	 requires	 a	 historically	
informed	 theory	 of	 power	 in	 capitalist	 relations,	 this	 far	more	 than	 laws	 as	 a	
metrics	exercise	would	make	sense	of	the	data.		
	
However,	 any	 effective	 attempt	 to	 explore	 such	 theory	would	quickly	 come	up	
against	the	problem	that	Piketty’s	core	claims	trade	on	the	ambiguous	status	of	
normal.	The	inferences	drawn	from	prior	and	from	duration	lend	credence	to	the	
sense	 that	 inequality	 is	 normal,	 but	 normal	 then	 further	 implies	 that	 the	
institutional	conditions	of	that	inequality	are	of	trans‐historical	significance.	They	
are	a	something	to	which	a	system	returns.	By	contrast,	periods	that	place	a	break	
on	 inequality	 are	 exceptional,	 and	 non‐necessary.	 But	 this	 implies	 that	 the	





The	basic	point	 is	 that	Piketty’s	 argument	 inadvertently	 reifies	one	aspect	of	 a	
system	that	exhibits	at	least	two	tendencies.	The	tendency	for	inequality	to	rise	
and	 the	 tendency	 for	 this	 to	 be	 offset,	 confronted	 and	 challenged.	 Piketty	
recognizes	 the	 two	 aspects	 and	 is	 actually	 intent	 on	 providing	 evidence	 and	
argument	(albeit	with	caveats	and	a	degree	of	hesitation)	 for	the	 latter,	yet	the	
theoretical	whole	 trades	 on	 the	 primary	 significance	 of	 the	 former.	 There	 is	 a	
problem	 of	 consistency	 here.	 Inequality	 is	 neither	 more	 basic	 nor	 more	
fundamental.	 It	 is	a	contingent	outcome	of	 institutional	enablement	that	allows	




to	 augment	 their	 own	 interests,	 and	 this	 will	 result	 in	 general	 in	 institutional	



























2014:	pp.	9‐10).xx	He	 shows	none,	 for	example,	 in	Polanyi	and	his	 concept	of	 a	
double	 movement	 (Polanyi,	 1944).	 A	market	 system	may	 well	 result	 in	 social	
organization	being	 reconfigured	as	a	 set	of	 institutions	around	 that	 system	–	a	
market	 society;	 but	 this	 is	 never	 complete,	 it	 always	 involves	 provocations	 to	
control	 the	 adverse	 consequences,	 injustices,	 and	 relative	 harms	 that	 arise.	
Neither	 is	 more	 necessary	 or	 fundamental	 to	 human	 existence,	 and	 each	 has	
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consequences	 for	 the	 other.	 So,	 for	 Polanyi	 the	 liberal	 state	 is	 a	 product	 and	
consequence	of	the	emergence	of	market	society.	Its	potentials	are,	therefore,	not	
an	 exception	 but	 an	 internal	 response.	 Still,	 in	 a	 certain	 sense,	 Piketty’s	work,	
taken	sympathetically,	might	be	read	as	a	resource	intended	to	enhance	the	breaks	
on	 a	 market	 system	 within	 a	 market	 society,	 and	 so	 be	 part	 of	 that	 internal	
response.	 Still,	 Piketty	 seems	 subject	 to	 Polanyi’s	 comment	 that	 “Nowhere	 has	
liberal	philosophy	failed	so	conspicuously	as	in	its	understanding	of	the	problem	




He	 has	 no	 theory	 of	 politics,	 no	 theory	 of	 the	 state,	 no	 theory	 of	 social	
movements,	no	theory	of	culture	and	above	all,	no	theory	of	capitalism.	He	
has	a	formula	for	increasing	inequality	but	the	factors	behind	the	variables	
(rate	 of	 return	 and	 economic	 growth)	 are	 left	 unexplained.	 (Burawoy,	
2014:	p.	12)		
	
Burawoy’s	 overriding	 concern	 is	 not	 to	 advocate	 Polanyi’s	 work	 in	 some	
unadulterated	 fashion,	 but	 rather	 to	 suggest	 any	 adequate	 account	 of	 modern	
capitalism	must	 have	 an	 internal	 sense	 of	 both	 particular	 causes	 and	 general	
processes.	 Polanyi,	 for	 example,	 did	 not	 foresee	 a	 new	market	 fundamentalist	
countermovement	of	the	type	we	have	witnessed,	nor	did	he	clearly	distinguish	




One	might	 think	 that	 focusing	 on	 additional	matters	 of	 theory	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
absence	of	adequate	concepts	that	account	for	change	etc	do	not	matter	a	great	
deal	here.	Piketty	 is	an	economist	and	not	a	sociologist.	His	work	 is	 in	 the	end	
empirical,	whilst	these	matters	of	theory	are	of	mere	academic	concern.	But	this	







is	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 terms	 of	 acknowledging	 that	Capital	 is	 a	 work	 of	
persuasion	seemingly	targeted	at	a	given	audience,	and	accepting	that	the	work	
has	broader	significance	as	is.	Clearly,	one	wants	to	avoid	the	gnomic	pursuit	of	
theory.	 Complexity	 as	 academic	 artifice	would	do	 a	 disservice	 to	 the	 empirical	
importance	of	 the	subject	matter	of	 inequality.	But	Piketty	situates	his	work	as		








As	several	 leading	post‐Keynesians	have	argued,	Capital	 lacks	 specific	 focus	on	
and	then	explanation	deriving	from	the	particular	sectors	primarily	responsible	





neoliberal	 period	 and	 have	 done	 so	 based	 on	 long	 supply	 chains	 and	 global	
outsourcing,	thus	increasing	the	subordination	of	production	to	the	power	of	the	







The	 existence	 of	 many	 specific	 policy	 approaches	 highlights	 that	 there	 is	 a	
question	mark	against	the	logic	of	argument	that	leads	to	the	global	wealth	tax.	
This	does	not	make	a	 focus	on	global	 issues	 irrelevant	–	 since	some	aspects	of	
capitalism	are	part	of	global	system	dynamics	(e.g.	investment	flows	undertaken	
by	 multinational	 corporations,	 including	 financial	 corporations,	 since	 this	 has	
many	ramifications	based	on	transfer	pricing	and	reporting	for	corporation	tax,	
local	 employment	 conditions,	 international	 employment	 competition	 that	
depresses	 wages,	 the	 potential	 for	 securitisation	 etc).	 However,	 Piketty’s	




measure	 of	 capital,	 and	 this	 then	 implies	 that	 there	 is	 one	 problem	 of	 capital	
subject	 to	 one	 solution	 to	 that	 problem	 (see	 Piketty,	 2014:	 p.	 534).	 But	 the	
requirement	 of	 a	 universal	 and	 global	 solution	 only	 follows	 if	 the	 problem	 is	
actually	universal	and	globally	uniform	in	its	sources.	It	may	be	possible	and	in	
some	ways	meaningful	to	provide	an	aggregate	measure	of	capital	that	is	universal	
and	uniform,	 but	 this	 then	makes	 the	possibility	 of	 the	 aggregate	measure	 the	


















taking	 back	 rather	 than	 preventing.	 A	 focus	 on	 taking	 back	 tends	 to	 imply	
redistribution,	but	this	then	requires	the	state	to	redistribute	(and	Piketty	is	not	





because	 of	 its	 own	 limited	 ambition.	 Given	 that	 Piketty’s	 main	 theoretical	
contribution	is	to	highlight	(without	exploring)	the	power	of	wealth	to	reproduce	












significance	 of	 debt‐dependent	 societies	 and	 inherently	 unstable	 financialised	









[T]hese	 things	 need	 to	 be	 said.		 Shared	 values	 and	 shared	 analysis	 are	
different.		 Shared	values	 can	 create	 short‐term	agreements	 that	obscure	
long‐term	conflicts	inherent	in	differences	of	reasoning.		Ideas	matter	and	
failure	to	articulate	ideas	truthfully	can	have	dire	consequences.		Academic	
economists	 have	 an	 obligation	 to	 state	 the	 theoretical	 issues	








































































































































































the	 return	 on	 capital,	 r,	 is	 systematically	 and	 necessarily	 higher	 than	 the	 growth	 rate	 g	 is	 the	
following.	If	r	were	less	than	g,	economic	agents,	realizing	that	their	future	income	(and	that	of	
their	 descendents)	 will	 rise	 faster	 than	 the	 rate	 at	 which	 they	 can	 borrow,	 will	 feel	 infinitely	
wealthy	and	will	therefore	wish	to	borrow	without	limit	in	order	to	consume	immediately	(until	r	
rises	above	g).	In	this	extreme	form,	the	mechanism	is	not	entirely	plausible,	but	it	shows	that	r>g	

















profit	 in	 total	 income,	which	 can	 be	written	 as	 P	 for	 profit	 and	Y	 for	 income	or	 P/Y;	 and	α	 is	
calculated	as	α	=	r	x	β;	where	β	is	the	capital	or	k	ratio	of	income	Y,	then	one	can	write	P/Y	=	r	x	
K/Y	and	rearrange	this	as	r	=	P/Y	÷	K/Y;	if	one	then	cancels	Y	then	one	is	left	with	r	=	P/K.	r	is	then	




savings	 rates	are	 falling	but	 the	value	of	 capital	 rising	because	of	market	 effects	 (including	 for	
example,	intra‐financial	multiplication).		
xviii 	Piketty	 has	 subsequently	 stated	 that	 he	 did	 not	 intend	 his	 discussion	 of	 the	 neoclassical	
production	function	and	its	specific	substitution	rate	to	be	read	in	the	way	it	has	been.	The	point	
was	to	address	a	neoclassical	audience	in	terms	they	would	understand	and	to	show	that	even	if	




concentrations	 of	 wealth	 and	 income.	 But	 what	 makes	 something	 inherent	 in	 a	 system	 like	
capitalism?		Why	are	mechanisms	of	concentration	inherent	whilst	those	that	prevent	this	are	not?	
Capitalism	 may	 have	 basic	 capacities	 and	 defining	 social	 relations	 but	 the	 actual	 distribution	
within	this	is	contingent	on	the	institutions	that	arise.	This	is	fundamental	to	Sraffa	and	Robinson’s	




that	 is	 basically	 Marxist	 and	 refers	 to	 a	 class.	 Recall:	 “Very	 soon,	 however,	 capital	 began	 to	
reconstitute	 itself.	 The	 growth	 of	 capital’s	 share	 accelerated	 with	 the	 victories	 of	 Margaret	
Thatcher	 in	 England	 in	 1979	 and	 Ronald	 Reagan	 in	 the	 United	 States	 in	 1980,	 marking	 the	
beginning	of	a	conservative	revolution	[…]	By	2010,	and	despite	the	crisis	that	began	in	2007‐2008	
capital	was	prospering	as	it	had	not	done	so	since	1913.”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	42)	
xxi 	Even	 the	 possible	 issue	 of	 a	 transnational	 capitalist	 class	 is	 not	 pursued	 despite	 the	
acknowledgement	that	“financial	globalization	has	made	it	more	difficult	to	measure	wealth	and	
its	distribution	in	a	national	framework:	inequality	of	wealth	in	the	twenty	first	century	will	have	
to	be	gauged	more	and	more	at	the	global	level.”	(Piketty,	2014:	p.	346)	It	seems	curious	that	a	data	
constraint	is	used	to	then	ignore	a	problem	of	explanatory	relevance.		
xxii	Piketty	does	not	address	the	way	MNCs	have	effective	monopoly	power,	nor	how	this	translates	
into	systems	of	political	patronage	and	policy	capture,	especially	in	democracies	where	political	
campaigning	and	party	activity	is	not	publically	funded	and	private	interests	are	not	curtailed;	he	
says	nothing	about	issues	of	privatisation	versus	nationalisation	for	natural	monopolies	and	for	
welfare	goods;	nor	does	he	address	the	living	wage,	the	minimum	wage,	citizen’s	income	or	the	
way	tax	systems	privilege	rentier	activity	in	general	(capital	gains	tax,	the	tax	status	of	debt	etc);	
or	how	the	whole	architecture	of	regional	institutions	is	currently	configured	to	punish	any	given	
state	that	attempts	to	place	its	people	before	its	existing	financial	commitments	–	anti‐austerity	
policies	are	not	wrong	per	se	–	they	are	simply	denied	the	scope	to	succeed	on	their	own	terms	(as	
Greece	is	currently	finding	in	its	negotiations	with	the	ECB);	nor	does	Piketty	address	what	it	might	
mean	to	definancialise	an	economy.		
	
